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After six decades of rising subsidy levels and
expansive regulatory controls, it appeared that
Washington’s role in agriculture would be
reduced with the enactment of the 1996 Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act. That
act aimed to decrease subsidies over seven years
and to move farming toward greater reliance on
market supply and demand.
Unfortunately, that promise collapsed in an
orgy of supplemental spending bills that have
increased federal farm subsidies to all-time
highs. Total direct subsidy payments to farmers
have soared to more than $20 billion per year
the past three years, up from an average of $9
billion per year in the early 1990s. 
There is little justification for the special
hold that the agricultural industry has on tax-
payers’ wallets. Other industries, such as the
high-tech industry, are also risky and subject to
large price swings but do not receive large-scale
government subsidies. Moreover, farm house-
holds have higher incomes, on average, than do
nonfarm U.S. households, and subsidies are
skewed toward the largest and wealthiest farm
businesses. Farm subsidies also subvert their
own goal: farmers demand subsidies because of
low market prices for their products, but subsi-
dies themselves contribute to lower prices. 
As Congress works to reauthorize farm pro-
grams, it threatens to move further away from
reform by institutionalizing high levels of farm
welfare. Instead, Congress should push the farm
sector back into the market economy by repeal-
ing federal farm subsidies.
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Introduction
On April 5, 1996, the New York Times ran
the headline: “Clinton Signs Farm Bill Ending
Subsidies.”1 After more than 60 years of gov-
ernment intervention in the agricultural sec-
tor, it appeared that Washington’s role would
be reduced with the enactment of the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996, also called the Freedom to Farm Act.2
The law aimed to reduce crop price manipula-
tions and subsidy levels over seven years and
move the farming community toward greater
reliance on market supply and demand.
Unfortunately, that promise collapsed in an
orgy of supplemental spending bills that have
increased federal farm subsidies to all-time highs.
Total direct subsidy payments to farmers have
soared to more than $20 billion per year the past
three years, up from an average of $9 billion per
year in the early 1990s. Congress has passed huge
supplemental farm bills every year since 1998; the
most recent bill, passed in July, has a taxpayer
price tag of $5.5 billion. As Congress works to
reauthorize farm programs, it appears set to
move further away from reform.
In addition to the fact that high and rising
farm subsidies are costly to taxpayers, they also
create vicious cycles in agricultural markets. In
particular, subsidies induce overproduction,
which pushes down prices and creates
demands for further subsidies. Farmers have
come to assume that regular subsidies and spe-
cial emergency bailouts will keep flowing, and
thus they continue producing in the face of
long-term declines in commodity prices.3
This paper documents the explosion of
farm subsidies that has occurred in recent
years, discusses the background to the FAIR
Act, assesses the law’s major policy changes,
and examines who receives the bulk of feder-
al subsidy payments. 
The Farm Subsidy
Explosion
Federal farm subsidies have exploded dur-
ing the past three years, reaching $22.9 bil-
lion in 2000 and a projected $20.4 billion in
2001 (Figure 1). Total agricultural spending,
including both direct subsidy payments and
expenditures of other Department of
Agriculture farm programs, was $37 billion
in fiscal 2000.4 This paper examines just the
direct subsidy payments. 
The 1996 farm reforms had aimed to
gradually reduce subsidies, but market prices
for many crops began to fall in 1998 and
Congress responded with the first of many
emergency spending bills to provide addi-
tional cash to farmers. President Bush signed
the most recent emergency subsidy bill,
which has a cost of $5.5 billion to federal tax-
payers, into law in July.
When the FAIR Act was passed, the
Congressional Budget Office projected that
$47 billion would be spent on direct farm
subsidies during its seven-year authoriza-
tion.5 Instead, direct farm subsidies will end
up costing $118 billion, including projected
spending for fiscal 2002, over seven years.6 So
instead of marking a scaling down of federal
farm subsidies, the FAIR Act launched an era
of rising farm welfare spending, and passing
farm emergency bills became routine for
Congress.
When most people think of farm “emer-
gencies,” they think of droughts or other nat-
ural disasters. But 80 percent of the emer-
gency funds dished out to farmers between
1998 and 2000 were intended simply to
boost farm incomes when prices were low,
not to be aid in response to natural disasters.7
It is very unusual for the federal government
to step in and compensate private industries
simply for swings in prices. Other industries,
such as the high-tech, energy, and mining
industries, experience wide fluctuations in
prices but generally do not receive federal
bailouts year after year.
Within the agricultural sector, it is only a
minority of farmers that are singled out for
both regular subsidies and emergency
bailouts. Farm products that receive large-
scale subsidies account for just 36 percent of
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Figure 1
Direct Government Payments to Farmers, 1990–2001
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, www.ers.usda.gov/data. 
Note: Years are calendar years. Figure for 2001 is estimated.
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Figure 2
Share of U.S. Farm Output by Subsidized and Unsubsidized Products, 1999
Source: Geoffrey S. Becker, “RS20848: Farm Community Programs: A Short Primer,” Congressional Research
Service, March 19, 2001. Statistics are for 1999.
cent of farm production is not on the subsidy
gravy train (Figure 2).8 In fact, more than 90
percent of direct federal subsidies go to farm-
ers that raise just five crops—wheat, corn, soy-
beans, rice, and cotton.9
The Structure of Farm
Subsidies and
the 1996 Reforms
Large-scale federal manipulations of agri-
cultural markets began as temporary mea-
sures under the New Deal in the 1930s.10 Like
many “temporary” measures introduced in
response to crises, farm programs have
proved to be long lasting and have principal-
ly taken the form of price supports and out-
put controls. Providing federal subsidies in
the form of price supports creates the chron-
ic problem of crop overproduction, thus
necessitating other federal programs to place
controls on output.
Problems Precipitating the 1996 Reforms
Before 1996 the main farm subsidy pro-
gram paid “deficiency” payments based on
legislated price support levels called target
prices. Eligible commodities included major
field crops such as wheat, corn, and rice.
Deficiency payments were based on the dif-
ference between the national average market
price and the national target price for a crop.
This meant that even though local market
prices varied between North Dakota and
Illinois, for example, farmers with the same
acreage received the same subsidy.1 1
Farmers were paid deficiency payments
for their base acreage in each particular crop.
So farmers were stuck producing certain
crops if they wanted to get their full subsidy.
To stem overproduction, the government
would pay farmers to set aside land in an
acreage reduction program. This meant that
if farmers wanted federal payments they were
obligated to not use all their land.
The resulting absence of planting flexibil-
ity and large-scale land idling created large
deadweight economic losses. The most effi-
cient selection of crops was not being plant-
ed, and much good farmland was going
unused, thus creating large output losses.
Those losses provided an important justifica-
tion for the 1996 reform legislation.12
In 1995 a combination of high commodi-
ty prices and optimism about export markets
sparked the possibility of serious reform.1 3
High prices meant that price support pay-
ments under the existing system were not
expected to be large in the next few years. In
addition, the Republican takeover of
Congress in 1994 created political support
for reducing government intervention in the
farm sector. Those factors culminated in the
passage in 1996 of the FAIR Act, which
restructured some of the main farm subsidy
programs under a seven-year authorization.
Transition Payments Replace Price
Supports in 1996
The centerpiece of the 1996 farm law was
the Agricultural Market Transition Act. The
word “transition” implied that farmers
would be weaned from 60 years of govern-
ment intervention and increase their reliance
on market supply and demand. The AMTA
replaced price support payments with pro-
duction flexibility contracts (PFCs) that were
fixed payments decoupled from market
prices. The government set total PFC subsidy
payments on a declining scale from $6 billion
in 1996 to $4 billion in 2002 (Figure 3).
The AMTA affected farmers of “program”
commodities, which include corn, wheat,
grain sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, and rice.
For those crops, deficiency payments, target
prices, acreage reduction programs, and gov-
ernment stockpiles were eliminated. Farmers
of those crops were allowed to plant any crop
they chose and their subsidy payments would
be at a fixed dollar level uncoupled from their
planting decisions.1 4 The introduction of
greater planting choice gave the 1996 bill its
informal name, Freedom to Farm Act.
The new rules under the 1996 law led to
significant reductions in deadweight losses
to the economy. The reduction in land idling
created by the 1996 law produced an estimat-
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ed efficiency gain of about $4 billion per year,
according to University of Maryland profes-
sor Bruce Gardner.15 By 1999, 20 to 30 mil-
lion acres that would have been wastefully
idled under prior rules were in production.1 6
The greater planting choice under the 1996
law allowed farmers to respond to changing
market conditions. For example, since 1996
about 12 million acres of soybeans have been
added while wheat acreage has been reduced
by about 10 million acres.17 New planting
flexibility has allowed farmers to change
crops in response to changing prices and cli-
mate conditions.18
Nonetheless, although the new PFC sub-
sidy payments are formally independent of
production, they still encourage oversupply.
For example, PFC subsidies increase farmers’
wealth and income, thus making it easier for
them to get loans for expansion. Farmers are
more willing to expand production and take
on more debt because guaranteed government
payments reduce the risk of not earning a
decent return on investment.19 Oversupply
incentives also continue under other pro-
grams not reformed in 1996, such as the mar-
keting loan program discussed below.
Aside from its economic effects, the new
subsidy regime has proven to be very costly to
taxpayers. With high prices in 1996, price sup-
port payments under the prior law were expect-
ed to be low. Thus supporters of big subsidies
hoped that the new fixed PFC payments would
boost subsidy levels at least in the short term.
Prices did remain high the first two years after
the 1996 law was enacted, and farmers pocket-
ed $11 billion more than they would have
under the old price support system.20
But as commodity prices began to slide in
1998, Congress quickly threw in the towel on
the fixed subsidy schedule agreed to in 1996
and passed the first of four large emergency
supplemental appropriations. The overly gener-
ous payments of the first couple of years of the
FAIR Act unfortunately whetted the appetite of
farmers for federal subsidies. John A.
Schnittker, former assistant secretary of agri-
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Figure 3
Direct Farm Subsidies by Federal Program, 1996–2001
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmincome/
data/GPT7.htm.
Note: Years are calendar years. Values for 2001 are estimated.
have insisted that the farm income threshold
established in 1996 and 1997 must be matched
year after year, whatever the cost.”21
Marketing Loan Program
The marketing loan program has been a
key part of federal farm subsidies since the
New Deal. This program was designed to
provide short-term financing to pay farm
expenses before crops were sold, but it has
morphed into simply another multi-billion-
dollar subsidy program.2 2 Eligible crops
include all of those eligible to receive PFC
payments (corn, wheat, cotton, rice,
sorghum, oats, barley) plus soybeans. 
Originally, farmers would repay market-
ing loans plus interest after crops were sold
in the market. However, the government set
up marketing loans to be “nonrecourse”
loans, so farmers can default on the loans
without penalty.2 3 When prices were high,
farmers would sell their crops on the market
and repay the government. When prices were
low, farmers were allowed to simply keep the
loan without any “recourse,” except to forfeit
their low-value crop to the government.
Taxpayers were stuck paying both the loan
costs and the costs of maintaining govern-
ment commodity stockpiles.24
Changes to the marketing loan program
under the FAIR Act removed the need for
farmers to forfeit crops to the government.
Subsidies are now delivered through market-
ing loan gains and loan deficiency payments.
In the first case, farmers put some of their
crop in storage as collateral and receive a loan
at a certain per unit rate. But farmers are
allowed to repay loans at lower government
loan repayment rates. The difference between
the original loan rate and the lower repay-
ment rate is the marketing loan gain, which
is a direct subsidy to farmers and a direct cost
to taxpayers.2 5
The second new option, loan deficiency pay-
ments (LDPs), reaches the same costly result in
a less complex way. LDPs allow farmers to
bypass the loan process and receive a subsidy
payment, which represents the marketing loan
gain, without actually dealing with the loan
process. Farmers can maximize their gains by
taking loan subsidies when market prices are
low and selling the crops later on when market
prices are higher.26
The marketing loan program is essentially
a large-scale price support program that sur-
vived the FAIR Act reforms. The program’s
cost has exploded to more than $5 billion per
year during the past three years (Figure 3).2 7
In this year’s debate over the new farm bill,
there are demands that Congress add yet
another price support or “counter-cyclical”
program to provide even larger subsidies
when prices are low. That seems entirely
duplicative of the marketing loan program. 
In addition to the taxpayer costs, market-
ing loan subsidies create incentives for exces-
sive crop production. In 2000 an estimated 4
to 5 million additional acres were planted in
the eight crops covered by the marketing
loan program because of the distorted incen-
tives that program creates.2 8 Another study
estimated that soybean plantings are 1 mil-
lion acres higher because of distortions creat-
ed under the marketing loan program.2 9 In
general, with lower prices in recent years, one
would expect farmers to reduce production,
but that has not occurred partly because of
the subsidies.3 0
The Conservation Reserve Program 
The other major farm program that pro-
vides direct subsidies is the conservation
reserve program (CRP). The CRP was created
in 1985 to idle millions of acres of environ-
mentally sensitive farmland. Under CRP,
farmers are paid on a per acre basis to not
grow crops for a fixed period of 10 to 15
years. In addition, the government pays farm-
ers half of the cost of growing ground cover,
such as grass or trees, on the retired acres.3 1
The cost of paying farmers to not farm
has averaged about $1.5 billion per year. As
an added unfair blow to taxpayers, almost
one-third of land idled under the CRP is
owned by retired farmers who don’t even
have to work to get the subsidies.3 2
Like the other farm subsidy programs, the















waste, by keeping productive land out of use.
Before 1996 land-idling programs left up to 58
million acres unplanted in some years.3 3 But
even after the 1996 reforms, 33 million acres
still remain idled under the CRP today.34
The CRP is an attempt to respond to envi-
ronmental concerns about overproduction
on marginal farmland. A much simpler and
more effective way to reduce overproduction
would be to simply eliminate all government
farm subsidies. U.S. agricultural policy cre-
ates endless vicious circles by encouraging
overproduction with subsidies and then pay-
ing more subsidies to reduce overproduction
and to shore up farmers’ incomes as prices
fall. Returning U.S. agriculture to reliance on
market incentives is the way out of these
counterproductive policy circles.
Where Does the Money Go?
Recipients of Farm Subsidies
There are about 2 million farms in the
United States, based on the government def-
inition of “farm” as any place with farm sales
of more than $1,000. But there are fewer than
1 million farms with sales of more than
$10,000.35 When farm programs began in the
1930s, there were 7 million farms, and 25 per-
cent of the population lived on farms.3 6
Today just 2 percent of the population live on
farms.3 7
These figures indicate that the federal gov-
ernment channels a huge chunk of taxpayer
money, more than $20 billion per year, to a
very small segment of the population. Indeed,
only 42 percent of farmers receive direct gov-
ernment subsidies.3 8And the producers of just
five crops—wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and
cotton—have somehow secured a direct
pipeline to more than 90 percent of federal
farm handouts.39 Other farmers, such as sugar
producers, do not grab taxpayer dollars direct-
ly but instead impose billions of dollars of
costs on consumers with supply restrictions
that push up prices.
Federal subsidies are concentrated on just
a few hundred thousand large farms that
have high incomes. In 1999 the largest 7 per-
cent of farms received 45 percent of all gov-
ernment subsidy payments.4 0By contrast, the
76 percent of farms that are classified as
small received just 14 percent of subsidies.4 1
One study covering 1996 to 1998 found that
61 percent of subsidies went to just 144,000
large farms.42 So while politicians love to dis-
cuss the plight of the small farmer, they actu-
ally dole out the bulk of subsidies to the
largest farms (Figure 4).
Note also that it is landowners, not farm
workers or operators, who generally benefit
from subsidies. That is because farm subsi-
dies largely get capitalized in higher farm and
land values.4 3 That has created another
vicious policy circle as high farm prices
caused partly by subsidies make it difficult
for young people to break into farming. Of
course, the federal government has respond-
ed to this problem it helped create by setting
up new programs to help young farmers
afford to farm.4 4
Federal Welfare for the Well-to-Do
Certainly redistributing more than $20 bil-
lion every year from taxpayers to just a few
hundred thousand businesses in one particu-
lar industry is not an appropriate government
function. Statistics indicate that farmers are
not even in particular need of this government
largesse. Consider farm wealth levels.
Department of Agriculture data show that the
average net worth of farm households was
$564,000 in 1999, compared to $283,000 for
nonfarm households in 1998 (the most recent
year for which data are available).4 5The figures
also show that the net worth of farm house-
holds increased faster than that of nonfarm
households during the 1990s.
Statistics on household income reveal a sim-
ilar pattern. For family farms, average house-
hold income was $64,347 in 1999, 17 percent
higher than the $54,842 average for all U.S.
nonfarm households.4 6 By contrast, when
large-scale federal farm subsidies began in the
1930s, farmers’ incomes were only half of the
national average.47 Although farm commodity
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farm production costs have fallen even faster as
productivity has risen, with the result that
farmers’ incomes have continued to rise.4 8Farm
households have the additional advantage that
the cost of living in rural areas is lower than in
the rest of the country.
Another measure of the agricultural com-
munity’s well-being is solvency. The
Department of Agriculture found that the
rate at which farms were going out of busi-
ness in the 1990s was between 2 and 3 per-
cent per year.4 9By contrast, the rate of failure
for nonfarm businesses was between 13 and
16 percent. 
More evidence points to the sound finan-
cial condition of most farmers. The
Department of Agriculture classifies a farm’s
finances as favorable if it has a positive net
farm income and a low debt/asset ratio. A
farm is classified as vulnerable if it has nega-
tive net farm income and a high debt/asset
ratio. Fifty-nine percent of farms are in the
favorable category, and only 5 percent are cat-
egorized as vulnerable.5 0
Even farms that face a few years of low crop
prices may not be in financial trouble because
many farm households earn the bulk of their
income from nonfarm sources. Nonfarm
income is a huge stabilizing force for farm
household finances today.5 1Most farm families
have at least one spouse who works off the
farm. Government figures show that in 1999
only 38 percent of farm households considered
farming their primary occupation, and a major-
ity of income for even those households came
from nonfarm sources.5 2
Those statistics indicate that the farming
community is in relatively good financial
condition. There is little evidence to suggest
that the agricultural sector is in a crisis that
requires a perpetual taxpayer bailout of more
than $20 billion per year.
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Figure 4
Share of Farms and Government Payments by Farm Type, 1998
Source: Robert A. Hoppe, ed., Structural and Financial Characteristics of U.S. Farms: 2001 Family Farm
Report, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service, Agriculture Information Bulletin no. 768,
May 2001, p. iv.
Outlook and Conclusion
Farm subsidies not only impose huge
costs on taxpayers; they also keep the agricul-
tural sector from adjusting to continually
changing economic realities. Subsidies aim
primarily to shield farmers from low com-
modity prices. But real prices of major farm
commodities have been falling for the past
50 years because of advances in technology
and economies of scale.5 3 That trend is
expected to continue.5 4 Farms that cannot
adjust should exit the industry.
Congress, which has handed out more
than $100 billion in subsidies since passing
the 1996 reform bill, now has another chance
to enact a real reform of farm programs.
Unfortunately, the House of Representatives’
version of the new farm bill goes in the oppo-
site direction. Its projected cost would be $170
billion over the next 10 years, or $74 billion
above 10-year baseline spending projections.5 5
There would be more money all around
under the House bill. PFC payments would
be extended with payment rates increased
and new crops added to the dole. The
counter-cyclical marketing loan program
would be retained with more commodities
eligible for subsidies. And a new counter-
cyclical subsidy program, reminiscent of the
price supports in place before 1996, has been
added to offset low prices. 
On the Senate side, Agriculture Committee
chairman Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and ranking
member Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) have
expressed concern about the House bill.
Senator Harkin would like to see more money
directed toward conservation programs and
away from income supports. So disagreement
on farm subsidies in Congress is not about
how much taxpayer money to spend but
about how to dish out subsidies. 
Ranking House Agriculture Committee
member Charlie Stenholm (D-Tex.) pro-
claimed that the proposed legislation was “a
good deal for agriculture and a good deal for
the taxpayer.”5 6 It is not a good deal for U.S.
agricultural production to be distorted by
such large subsidies, and it is certainly not a
good deal for U.S. taxpayers who foot the bill.
After six decades of government intervention
and rising subsidies, it is time for Congress to
phase out the farm welfare state.
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